

CHINA PAPERS
No. 15

CIC

CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL
CONSEIL INTERNATIONAL DU CANADA

THE CANADA-TAIWAN
PARLIAMMENTARY
FRIENDSHIP GROUP

Myles Hulme

July 2010

Canadian International Council
www.onlinecic.org

Conseil international du Canada
www.cicenligne.org

ABSTRACT

On October 13, 1970, Canada signed an agreement on the exchange of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Within this agreement, Canada "took note" of China's claim to Taiwan, and defined this phrase as "neither an endorsement of nor a challenge to" that claim. In subsequent years, Canada has effectively managed a "one-China" policy on these terms. However, its operation has never been perfectly smooth. The existence of a separate authority in Taiwan with a keen interest in maintaining an international identity has meant that Canada has always been confronted with a need to manage its agreement with China in light of this reality. Within this context, this paper analyzes how Taiwan has been able to work its international identity in Canada by making contacts with the Parliament of Canada. Its three sections analyze the initial contacts Taiwan made in the 1970s; the creation of the Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group in the 1980s; and the more recent activities of the Friendship Group in the 1990s and 2000s.

RÉSUMÉ

Le 13 octobre 1970, le Canada signait avec la République populaire de Chine un accord établissant officiellement des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays. Aux termes de cet accord, le Canada « prend note » que la Chine revendique l'île de Taïwan mais précise qu'il le fait « sans contester ni avaliser » cette revendication. Par la suite, le Canada privilégiera effectivement une politique axée sur « une seule Chine », dont l'application n'a toutefois jamais été parfaitement harmonieuse. Car l'existence à Taïwan d'un pouvoir distinct fermement déterminé à préserver son identité internationale l'a contraint à tenir compte de cette réalité dans toutes ses relations avec la Chine. C'est dans ce contexte que la présente étude analyse comment Taïwan a affirmé son identité internationale au Canada en tissant des liens avec le Parlement canadien. Ses trois sections retracent les contacts initiaux établis par Taïwan dans les années 1970, la création du Groupe interparlementaire d'amitié Canada-Taïwan dans les années 1980 et les activités plus récentes de ce Groupe d'amitié dans les années 1990 et 2000.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Myles Hulme is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. He recently completed a six-month period of research in Taipei at National Chengchi University with the assistance of an NCCU International PhD Research Scholarship. His research interests include the evolving state of more traditional avenues in international relations such as diplomacy and sovereignty in the context of "Greater China."

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Canadian International Council, its Senate or its Board of Directors.

If you would like to download a copy of this report please visit www.onlinecic.org

If you would like to be added to our mailing list or have questions about our publications please contact: info@onlinecic.org

ISSN 1921-9865 (Online) ISSN 1921-9881 (Print)

© 2010 Canadian International Council

INTRODUCTION

When Canada established a diplomatic relationship with the People's Republic of China on October 13, 1970, the diplomatic relationship Canada had maintained with the Republic of China since December 20, 1928 was severed.¹ The severed diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China was straightforward. The People's Republic of China, in control of the Mainland Area of China, and the Republic of China, in control of the diminutive albeit salient Taiwan Area, both refused to establish or to maintain a diplomatic relationship with any state engaged in an equivalent sovereign diplomatic relationship with the other China.² The realistic option for Canada, therefore, after its decision to negotiate a sovereign diplomatic relationship with the People's Republic of China, was the adoption of a "one-China" agreement, and the articulation of an alternative, non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China (or, for legal precision in the aftermath of the October 13, 1970 Joint Communiqué, with Taiwan.)³

The "one-China" agreement was included within the October 13, 1970 Joint Communiqué of the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and its specific formulation continues to operate as the bilateral legal framework for the conduct of both the sovereign diplomatic relations Canada has developed with the People's Republic of China, and the articulation of the non-sovereign diplomatic relations Canada has developed with Taiwan.⁴ Within the diplomatic text of the Joint Communiqué, are two passages relevant to the articulation and conduct of the "one-China" agreement, at least as concerns these two distinct, albeit interlinked, diplomatic relationships; these two passages are situated within the second and third articles of the four-article diplomatic text.⁵ They warrant explicit reproduction and a brief analysis here, because each is profoundly relevant to both the sovereign and non-sovereign diplomatic relationships Canada has developed with the People's Republic of China and Taiwan:

2. The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government.
3. The Canadian Government recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.⁶

The third article represents the decision of Canada to recognize the People's Republic of China as the singular sovereign Government of China, and operates as the basic international legal framework for the articulation of a bilateral sovereign diplomatic relationship. In practical terms, insofar as the third article is enacted in the international policies and practices of the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of China, these two states are able to share in a sovereign diplomatic relationship defined within the regular international legal mechanisms and networks as codified within the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.⁷ The second article represents, in its first sentence, the sovereign claim of the People's Republic of China to Taiwan, and it concludes, in its second sentence, with the "takes note of" formulation the Government of Canada, defined as neither an endorsement of nor a challenge to the sovereign claim of the People's Republic of China to Taiwan.⁸ It is within the boundaries of the "takes note of" formulation that Canada and Taiwan are able to articulate a diplomatic relationship, albeit a non-sovereign diplomatic

1 Evans, "Canada and Taiwan," 166; Chiu, "Sino-Canadian Relations," 26-30.

2 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 28th Parliament, 1st Session, 5044; Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, 50.

3 Frolic, "The Trudeau Initiative," 193-216; Wu, *Institutional Development and Adaptability*, 255-357. For the complete elaboration of the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Canada and China, refer to Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, 49-51.

4 Canada, House of Commons *Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Evidence*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session (June 14, 2005).

5 Edmonds, "Canada's Recognition," 201-17.

6 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, 49.

7 United Nations, "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations," 95-110; United Nations, "Vienna Convention on Consular Relations," 261-89.

8 Canada, House of Commons *Debates: Official Report*, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, 49-50.

relationship, resident beneath the upper limit of the “one-China” agreement, wherein Canada agreed not to challenge the sovereign claim of the People’s Republic of China to Taiwan.⁹

This non-sovereign diplomatic relationship is a remarkable achievement, because it has not depended upon any of the usual international legal mechanisms and networks available to a sovereign diplomatic relationship.¹⁰ The inventiveness of the relationship aside, it has without a doubt encountered a number of difficult circumstances insofar as the “one-China” agreement Canada signed with the People’s Republic of China was never endorsed or recognized as an international legal agreement by Taiwan. For the past 40 years, therefore, there has existed an element of tension in the non-sovereign diplomatic mechanisms and networks Canada and Taiwan have developed, because on the one side there is an agreement to ensure the creation and operation of these networks remains within the boundaries of the “one-China” agreement, and on the other side there is a desire to augment the creation and operation of these networks to reflect the sovereign self-representation of the government in control of Taiwan.¹¹ The boundaries of the “one-China” agreement are, furthermore, somewhat unclear insofar as a “challenge” to the sovereign claim of the People’s Republic of China to Taiwan is not an easy or straightforward issue to determine.

The analysis presented in the subsequent sections of this paper focuses on a particular example of a difficult circumstance in the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship Canada has developed with Taiwan, and it employs the information provided in this introduction as a backdrop. The difficult circumstance investigated in the analysis is a product of the efforts of the Government of Taiwan to forge a network with the Parliament of Canada, and to use this network to enhance the development of its general diplomatic relationship with Canada. On a basic level, the difficult circumstance is a product of the unclear status – sovereign or non-sovereign – of the network established with Parliament, because the MPs who partake in the network, and who make frequent trips to Taiwan at the invitation of its government, are representable either as sovereign government officials or as non-sovereign private citizens.

We begin in the first section of this paper with an investigation into the origins of the network with the Parliament of Canada, and continue, in the second section, with an investigation into the creation of the Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group. The analysis concludes, in the third section, with an investigation into the recent activities of the network on a whole and of the Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group in particular.

THE ORIGINS OF THE NETWORK WITH THE PARLIAMENT OF CANADA

The October 13, 1970 Joint Communiqué of the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of China marked a significant change in the international status and fortunes of the Republic of China, the government with an effective control over the Taiwan Area, because included within the Joint Communiqué was the first bilateral articulation of a “one-China” agreement with the People’s Republic of China, the government with an effective control over the Mainland Area. The period subsequent to the October 13, 1970 Joint Communiqué witnessed what was, in effect, an international cascade of severed sovereign diplomatic relationships with the Republic of China as states around the world emulated, albeit with subtle variations in the language applied, the “one-China” agreement Canada had formulated with the People’s Republic of China.¹² As time passed, the sovereign diplomatic networks available to the Republic of China became fewer, and the Taiwan Area under its effective control became, in a fashion, blockaded from international participation due to

9 Madsen, “The Struggle for Sovereignty,” 158-80.

10 Wu, *Institutional Development and Adaptability*.

11 Madsen, “The Struggle for Sovereignty,” 158-80; Paltiel, “Constructing the State,” 354-56; Wu, “Canada and the Global Diffusion,” 329-36.

12 Republic of China, Government Information Office, *Republic of China*, 1986, 352; Saywell, “A Shifting Asian Power Balance,” 7-11; Wu, “Canada and the Global Diffusion,” 324-29.

the expansion in the number of "one-China" agreements, and to the effective supervision and enforcement of these agreements on a bilateral basis with the use of the sovereign diplomatic networks the People's Republic of China had established with other states and, in a somewhat different context, with international institutions.¹³

The Republic of China was not hesitant in its reaction to the expansion in the international network of bilateral "one-China" agreements, and it began to articulate a diplomatic program developed under the rubric of an "all-out" diplomatic effort in order to salvage, maintain, enhance, or even to re-establish, on a sovereign basis, its diplomatic relationships. On September 24, 1971, the premier of the Republic of China, Yen Chia-kan, announced the all-out diplomatic program in a speech delivered to the Legislative Yuan, and in the subsequent four decades the all-out diplomatic effort continued to evolve under a series of different rubrics such as the "total," "pragmatic," and "flexible" diplomatic programs. Insofar as Premier Yen's speech contained most of the significant elements in the diplomatic program of the Republic of China for 40 years, it warrants being reproduced and analyzed here:

Facing the present uncertain international circumstances, we are counting on our undaunted determination and the spirit of independence and self-determination to assure the carrying on of our persevering struggle. The Government [of the Republic of China] has been taking flexible actions of response to strengthen our diplomatic front. We are mobilizing all available manpower and financial resources under a single command to coordinate the struggle and carry out the functions of an all-out diplomacy...Through wide-ranging international economic and technical cooperation, cultural exchanges and mutual visitation, we are trying on the one hand to broaden international friendships, and bring more friendly nations on our side.¹⁴

The all-out diplomatic program envisaged in the words of Premier Yen involved the application of the substantive elements of a diplomatic relationship, but it did not involve, due to the diplomatic circumstances of the Republic of China, the application of the status-based international legal elements of a sovereign diplomatic relationship. The planned application of the substantive elements of a diplomatic relationship was, of course, intended to re-establish, in each case, a status-based sovereign diplomatic relationship, whether the application was with Canada or with another state. But despite expressed optimism in the Republic of China for a certain degree of success from the all-out diplomatic program, it was, without a doubt, designed for an extended period of operation. Within the period just prior to and just after Premier Yen's speech, the diplomatic structure of the Republic of China was modified in order to undertake the substance-based requirements of the all-out diplomatic program. In certain cases, the Republic of China established new diplomatic institutions with a focus on international economic, cultural, or technical relationships. The China External Trade Development Council, established on July 1, 1970 with a mandate to promote international economic relationships, was one such example of a new diplomatic institution. The Republic of China also enhanced the diplomatic capabilities of its older institutions with the addition of an international affairs section. The General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China, authorized to establish an international affairs section in 1973, was one example.¹⁵

The earliest empirical effect in Canada from the all-out diplomatic effort of the Republic of China was the establishment of a Far East Trade Services office in Montreal a few months after the Republic of China had closed its sovereign diplomatic establishments in Ottawa and Vancouver.¹⁶ This office was linked with the China External Trade Development Council, an institution set up under the chairmanship of Sun Yun-suan, the minister of economic affairs, and its operations were partnered after a few years with the establishment of the Far East

13 Cho, *Taiwan's Application to GATT/WTO*; Wu, "Yi Zhong (Ge Biao)," 131-58.

14 Yen, "Premier Yen Chia-kan's Administrative Report," 71.

15 "Economic Milestones," in *Free China Review* 20:8 (August 1970), 53-54; Wu, *Institutional Development and Adaptability*, 325.

16 Library and Archives Canada, *Consular Affairs – Policy and Plans – Consular Relations and Representation by Canada and Other Countries, 1965-1984* (October 11, 1970); Wu, *Institutional Development and Adaptability*, 316-17.

Trade Services offices in Toronto and Vancouver in 1975 and 1981.¹⁷ The second empirical effect in Canada was the establishment of a General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China office in Toronto on July 11, 1980 after the short-lived Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister Joe Clark granted its approval in June 1979. The General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China was, even before the establishment of its office in Toronto, in direct contact with a number of politicians and businesspersons in Canada, and after the establishment of its International Affairs Section under the directorship of Chen Chih-Chen in 1973, the General Chamber of Commerce began to engage in the organization of a number of prominent commercial delegations from Taiwan to cities in the western, central and Atlantic regions of Canada.¹⁸

It could be argued that the offices of the Far East Trade Services were in all likelihood enabled without the support or sanction of the Government of Canada, because its offices (at least based on the available evidence) operated within the boundaries of market information collection and international economic exchange. The General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China office in Toronto, was something quite different, however, because it was linked in an explicit fashion to a well-established semi-governmental institution in Taiwan, and because it included staff members who, in comparison with the staff members of the Far East Trade Services offices, maintained a deeper and, in at least one case, a more obvious connection with the Government of the Republic of China.¹⁹ Approval for the creation of the General Chamber of Commerce office in Toronto was, as mentioned, an act of the Government of Canada, and it operated as a legitimate institution, albeit not without incident, until its closure, along with that of the Far East Trade Services offices, in 1994. The General Chamber of Commerce office was, however, the subject of a significant amount of protest from the People's Republic of China, articulated in reference to the bilateral "one-China" agreement.²⁰

The final element in the speech Premier Yen delivered to the Legislative Yuan is important, therefore, because it refers to the practice of mutual visits, and it is apparent in hindsight how vital these mutual visits were to the objectives of the Republic of China when it was decided the boundaries of a particular bilateral "one-China" agreement might need to be widened to fulfill the objectives of the all-out diplomatic program. The boundaries of the "one-China" agreement in Canada were operated under the management of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and because the Republic of China considered these boundaries to be far too restrictive, it decided to engage on a personal level an assortment of academics, journalists, legislators, and other members of the public in Canada. The element of mutual visits within the all-out diplomatic program of the Republic of China was the subject of a certain degree of negative attention in Canada, because it was considered to be problematic for the Department of Foreign Affairs to fulfill its role as the manager of the "one-China" agreement when changes to the operation of the agreement were being generated, at least to a certain extent, outside of its purview.²¹

The first invitation offered to a Canadian MP to visit Taiwan and to hear a first-hand account of the diplomatic program of the Republic of China occurred in the second half of 1973, but it was clear from the earliest stages in the operation of the "one-China" agreement that the Parliament of Canada was, at least to some extent, susceptible to the diplomatic efforts of the Republic of China.²² When Mitchell Sharpe, the minister of foreign affairs, announced the "one-China" agreement to the House of Commons on October 13, 1970, he

17 "Economic Milestones," in *Free China Journal* issues 26:10 (October 1976), 38; 27:11 (November 1977), 35-36; 28:9 (September 1978), 41; 28:10 (October 1978), 39; 29:6 (June 1979), 39-40; 30:10 (October 1980), 41; Republic of China, Government Information Office, *Republic of China 1983*, 304; Auman, "Is Canada Missing Chances?"

18 The first General Chamber of Commerce commercial delegation from Taiwan to Canada occurred in 1976. See Republic of China, Government Information Office, *China Yearbook: 1977*, 350; *China Yearbook: 1980*, 350; *Republic of China 1983*, 304; *Republic of China 1986*, 532; Wu, *Institutional Development and Adaptability*, x, 323-25, 327-28, 330-31.

19 Interview with David Lee, November 19, 2008; Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy Relations– Taiwan, 1984-1986 (May 14, 1985; February 12, 1986).

20 LAC, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian Foreign Policy and Relations – Taiwan, 1989-1989 (August 14, 1989); Wu, *Institutional Development and Adaptability*, 330.

21 The inclusion of mutual visitations in the all-out diplomatic program of the Republic of China was never concealed, and a massive list of journalists, academics, and legislators who visited Taiwan from states around the world can be compiled from the diplomatic and general yearbooks published in the Republic of China.

22 Cotter, "Ousted from Ottawa."

elicited a mixed response. For the most part, Liberal MPs were in substantial concurrence with the decision of the Liberal government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to establish a sovereign diplomatic relationship with the People's Republic of China, and because of the shared, albeit opposed, "one-China" policies of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, Liberal MPs were prepared to accept the severed sovereign diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China. Opposition Progressive Conservative MPs, however, articulated serious reservations on the subject of the "one-China" agreement, and its consequential feature of a severed sovereign diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China. Leader Robert Stanfield stated: "I recognize the fact that it is appropriate to establish diplomatic relations with [the People's Republic of China] under the proper conditions. I still believe that it is not appropriate to accept as a condition the withdrawal of recognition [from] the Government [of the Republic of China on] Taiwan...I do not approve of the Government of Canada having accepted that condition and I wish to make this very clear."²³

A significant element in the diplomatic program of the Republic of China in Canada was to make contact with federal legislators who might be inclined to assist in its all-out diplomatic program. Establishing contact with the Parliament of Canada was not simple, however, due to the operative guidelines of the "one-China" agreement, which were designed to avoid all government-to-government contacts with the Republic of China, and to preserve, at a maximum, the people-to-people contacts with Taiwan, defined as economic, cultural, and technical relationships.²⁴ The solution the Republic of China devised and implemented to circumvent the "one-China" boundaries was to recruit a local public relations firm, Robert T. Smylie and Co. Ltd., to contact MPs in an indirect fashion.²⁵

Company president Robert T. Smylie claimed, in a statement published in the *Globe and Mail* on September 29, 1973, to have received "a letter cold in the mail" from the Chinese Information Services office in New York.²⁶ He also claimed that after initial contact was made with his solicitor in New York, he received an invitation to visit Taiwan for a discussion on the possible appointment of his firm as the public relations representative in Canada of the Republic of China.²⁷ Smylie obliged, and his public relations firm began to issue letters and telephone calls to MPs, who were invited, in each case, to visit Taiwan at the expense of the Republic of China.²⁸ The first set of invitations was targeted at a delegation of MPs and journalists on the roster of an official visit by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to the People's Republic of China from October 10 to 17, 1973, but this attempt failed to solicit a positive response from a single MP, owing to significant disapproval from the Liberal government and the Department of Foreign Affairs.²⁹ The second set of invitations was issued in a much more low-key fashion, and the first delegation of MPs from Canada to visit Taiwan since the October 13, 1970 Joint Communiqué departed on January 5, 1974.³⁰

This delegation included Progressive Conservatives Lloyd Crouse (who led the delegation) and Marcel Lambert, and Liberals Jacques Trudel and Victor Railton, and it received, as did all subsequent delegations, an all-expenses paid visit to Taiwan, from January 6 to 11, 1974. The group met with a number of government officials to discuss issues related to what were, for the most part, the basic elements of the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship Canada and Taiwan maintained. According to Lloyd Crouse's report on March 4, 1974 to the House of Commons, included within the discussions was a request to upgrade the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with the establishment of a Liaison Office in Taiwan similar to what the United States had established in the Mainland Area despite its maintaining a sovereign diplomatic relationship with the Republic

23 Tommy Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party, and Réal Caouette, leader of the Social Credit Party, also delivered statements in support of the Republic of China. See Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, 50-51.

24 Library and Archives Canada, Consular Affairs – Policy and Plans – Consular Relations and Representation by Canada and Other Countries – Taiwan, 1965-1984, (October 11, 1970; November 3, 1970).

25 "Toronto Firm to Represent Taiwan"; Cotter, "Ousted from Ottawa."

26 The Chinese Information Services office in New York was associated with the Government Information Office in the Republic of China.

27 Cotter, "Ousted from Ottawa."

28 "Toronto Firm to Represent Taiwan"; Cotter, "Ousted from Ottawa"; Johnson, "10 MPs Accept"; "Tory MPs Treated."

29 Cotter, "Ousted from Ottawa"; Wu, *Institutional Development and Adaptability*, 305-07.

30 "The Month in Free China," 5; "Events from Day-to-Day," in *Free China Review* 24:2, 60; Republic of China, Government Information Office, *China Yearbook: 1975*, 361.

of China.³¹ Crouse's argument was, in effect, a perfect representation of the all-out diplomatic program of the Republic of China, because it relied at each point of its elaboration on substantive-based issues to promote status-based results. Although the argument appears to have borne no immediate empirical results, its force continued to build as each year successive delegations of MPs visited Taiwan.³²

The year after the first delegation's visit, the invitations continued to be issued on behalf of the Republic of China from the offices of Robert T. Smylie and Co. Ltd., and a further seven MPs, in a series of separate delegations, accepted.³³ Robert Coates, a Progressive Conservative with an appreciation for the rhetoric of anti-communism expressed in the diplomatic struggle of the Republic of China with the People's Republic of China, accepted an invitation to visit Taiwan in April 1975, and after his return to Canada he delivered his own message to the House. His message differed from Lloyd Crouse's in its anti-communist content, but it did contain a similar plea for a Liaison Office in Taiwan and – in a new twist – in Canada.³⁴ Coates's message was reinforced a mere two months later with a second speech from Progressive Conservative Lloyd Crouse on the establishment of an office in Taiwan and also in Canada.³⁵

The program of diplomatic visits by MPs to Taiwan continued in a similar fashion and with similar results in 1976 and 1977, but in 1978 it changed somewhat, because Robert T. Smylie, with the assistance of a number of politicians and businesspersons, established the Canada–Taiwan Trade Council, to replace his company as the mechanism of indirect contact with Parliament.³⁶ Robert T. Smylie and Co. Ltd. was, however, responsible for the initial indirect contacts the Republic of China made from 1974 until 1978 with members of the House of Commons and, to a lesser extent, of the Senate. A complete list of parliamentary visitors to Taiwan, 21 in total, is not available, but even an incomplete list provides some insight. The Progressive Conservatives who visited Taiwan from 1974 until 1978 were, from the earliest visit until the latest, Lloyd Crouse, Marcel Lambert, Robert Coates, Claude Wagner, Edward Lumley, Frank Oberle, Robert Muir, and Otto Jelinek; the Liberals were Jacques Trudel, Victor Raiton, Arthur Portelance, Hugh Alan Anderson, Ralph Stuart, Tom Lefebvre, Paul Langlois, and Eymard Corbin.³⁷

The Progressive Conservatives, on a basis of their numbers in the House of Commons, accepted more invitations, than the Liberals, who were more inclined to accept the operative guidelines of the "one-China" agreement. The difference is, at least in appearance, not substantial, but it is worthwhile to consider it in light of the establishment of the General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China office in Toronto. From the time of the October 13, 1970 Joint Communiqué, the Liberals governed under Pierre Trudeau, and from the 1974 federal election until the 1979 federal election the Liberals maintained 141 of the 264 seats in the House of Commons, in comparison with the 95 seats the Progressive Conservatives maintained. The period of Liberal tenure did not witness a single substantive change in the operation of the "one-China" agreement, and the multiple requests for the reciprocal establishment of an office with Taiwan did not elicit Liberal government support. The indirect contact the Republic of China had established with Parliament appeared, therefore, during these four and a half years not to have a substantial impact, because the Government of Canada, in the form

31 The United States established a Liaison Office in the Mainland Area on May 1, 1973, and it did not sever its sovereign diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China until January 1, 1979. See Kissinger, *White House Years*, 786, 1092-93; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 61-63, 67.

32 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 29th Parliament, 2nd Session, 124.

33 Republic of China, Government Information Office, *China Yearbook: 1976, 362*; "Events from Day to Day," in *Free China Journal* 25:11, 45.

34 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 30th Parliament, 1st Session, 7178.

35 *Ibid.*, 12406. Lloyd Crouse delivered a third and fourth speech on the reciprocal establishment of offices in Canada and Taiwan. See Canada, House of Commons *Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade*, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session (October 22, 1974), 27-29; (February 12, 1975), 29-30.

36 Liberal Senator Richard Stanbury was a co-founder alongside Robert T. Smylie of the Canada–Taiwan Trade Council. Sidney B. Handleman, a member of the Ontario Legislature, was on its board of directors. See Rusk, "Taiwanese Are Trying Hard"; "Taiwan Trade"; Lukaszewicz, "Dramatic Growth is Expected"; Lukaszewicz, "Taiwan Grain Orders"; "Sidney B. Handleman"; Smylie, "Trade with Taiwan"; Westell, "Senator Tries to Promote"; Williamson, "Closed Doors Hid Feeble Parlay"; Lukaszewicz, "Imports Pour In."

37 Republic of China, Government Information Office: *China Yearbook: 1975, 361*; *China Yearbook: 1976, 362*; *China Yearbook: 1977, 349-50*; *China Yearbook: 1978, 345-46*; *China Yearbook: 1979, 347-48*; "The Month in Free China," 5; "Events from Day to Day," *Free China Journal*, issues 25:11, 45; 26:2, 57; 26:3, 57; 27:4, 52; 28:3, p. 49. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 29th Parliament, 2nd Session, 124; Johnson, "10 MPs Accept"; Cleroux, "Former Minister a Veteran Traveller"; "Tory MPs Treated to Mideast Junket."

of the Liberal Cabinet of Pierre Trudeau, did not respond to the messages delivered on behalf of the Republic of China. In the aftermath of the 1979 federal elections, however, the Progressive Conservatives formed a short-lived government under Joe Clark, and within its six-month window of operation from May 1979 until December 1979 it granted approval for the creation of the General Chamber of Commerce office in Canada.³⁸

The establishment of the General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China office in Toronto was the first substantive result of the all-out diplomatic program as it related specifically to the network the Republic of China had established with the Parliament of Canada. The fact the office was created during the short-lived Progressive Conservative government of Joe Clark, and not the long-tenured Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau, indicated an element of partisanship in the engagement of interests within Parliament, and although the Progressive Conservatives had maintained a more favourable disposition towards Taiwan since the announcement of the Joint Communiqué, it is quite probable that the establishment of the network with the Parliament of Canada maintained the favourable disposition and focused its interests on a specific diplomatic objective.

The next section of this paper takes the analysis of the network beyond its origins, and investigates the creation of the Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group in 1982 within the context of the all-out diplomatic program of the Republic of China.³⁹

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CANADA–TAIWAN PARLIAMENTARY FRIENDSHIP GROUP

The Republic of China was, for the most part, successful in its adaptation to the expansion in the number of bilateral “one-China” agreements the People’s Republic of China had established with other states, but the decision of the United States on December 15, 1979 to sign a bilateral “one-China” agreement with the People’s Republic of China, and to sever on January 1, 1979 its sovereign diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China, marked a second significant change in its international status and fortunes.⁴⁰ The Republic of China had lost, for all intents and purposes, the diplomatic struggle to represent itself as the Government of China, and the People’s Republic of China had positioned itself to rise as an international power with the assistance of the international resources and influence it had acquired with the establishment of its sovereign diplomatic relationships.⁴¹ The international status and fortunes of the Republic of China were granted an unexpected reprieve, however, owing to a legislative process initiated in the Congress of the United States, where from January 15, 1979 until March 29, 1979 the members developed and sanctioned a national legal framework entitled the *Taiwan Relations Act*, in order to articulate an enhanced, non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.⁴²

The sovereign diplomatic relationship the Republic of China maintained with the United States until January 1, 1979 contained an indispensable assortment of the diplomatic mechanisms and networks the Republic of China relied upon for its access to international resources and, in a related fashion, for its international survival. The Republic of China was focused, therefore, for obvious reasons, on the preservation of its sovereign diplomatic relationship with the United States, but because its expressions of protest targeted at the December 15, 1978 decision of the United States to adopt a “one-China” agreement with the People’s Republic of China failed to elicit a positive response, the Republic of China was forced, reluctantly, to shift its focus towards the articulation of a non-sovereign diplomatic relationship. The United States was receptive, and the administration

38 Republic of China, Government Information Office, *China Yearbook: 1980*, 350; Chiu, “Sino-Canadian Relations”; Evans, “Canada and Taiwan,” 174.

39 Bedeski, “Canada, Mainland China, and Taiwan,” 189; Fritzen, “Sino-Canadian Relations,” 312; Wu, *Institutional Development and Adaptability*, 335; “MPs to Visit Taiwan.”

40 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 196-227; Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 188-99.

41 Bush, *At Cross-Purposes*, 145; Lee, *The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act*, 14-15; Madsen, “The Struggle for Sovereignty,” 156-63.

42 Lee, *The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act*; Myers, *A Unique Relationship*; United States, United States Congress, *Taiwan Relations Act*.

of President Jimmy Carter was intent on presenting a piece of draft legislation to Congress in order to fulfill the objective after it had engaged in a series of consultations with the administration of President Chiang Ching-kuo.⁴³

The Carter administration conducted a series of consultations with the Chiang administration from December 27, 1978 until February 28, 1979, and in the intermediate stages of these consultations, in spite of the persistence of certain unresolved issues on the subjects of regional strategic concerns and the reciprocal establishment of non-sovereign diplomatic offices, it presented a piece of draft legislation, the Taiwan Omnibus Bill, to Congress.⁴⁴ The Bill was designed to articulate, within the boundaries of the January 1, 1979 "one-China" agreement, a non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, but the Congress, after its reception of the Bill on January 15, 1979, identified what it believed to be some unresolved issues similar to those the Chiang administration had identified in its consultations with the Carter administration. Accordingly it decided to engage in a redraft process, from January 15, 1979 until March 29, 1979. The result was the *Taiwan Relations Act*, and although it was unclear at the time – due to the concerns of the Carter administration and the protestations of the People's Republic of China – whether the Act fit within the boundaries of the January 1, 1979 "one-China" agreement, it was sanctioned in Congress with a significant amount of support on March 29, 1979, and was accepted as an effective piece of national legislation on June 22, 1979 with a retroactive effect dated back to January 1, 1979.⁴⁵

The redraft process was controversial, and the *Taiwan Relations Act*, despite the benefits it provided to the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship the United States developed with Taiwan, was a significant source of contention in the sovereign diplomatic relationship the United States developed with the People's Republic of China. The unresolved issues the Chiang administration and Congress had identified in the Taiwan Omnibus Bill were to a significant extent resolved in the *Taiwan Relations Act* after a series of passages on regional strategic concerns and an enhanced provision for the number and operation of non-sovereign diplomatic offices was incorporated.⁴⁶ The incorporation of these passages was controversial, however, because the Carter administration was not an active supporter of the redraft process, and each one of these novel and enhanced passages drew significant protest from the People's Republic of China, articulated in reference to the January 1, 1979 "one-China" agreement.⁴⁷ To explain the controversial redraft process and its resultant product, the *Taiwan Relations Act*, it is worthwhile to consider them in reference to the all-out diplomatic program of the Republic of China.

The Republic of China engaged in the design of the all-out diplomatic program in order to respond to the threat of its diplomatic isolation in the aftermath of the October 13, 1970 "one-China" agreement Canada had signed with the People's Republic of China. While the all-out diplomatic program was designed in certain respects to be applied in states engaged in a non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, it was also designed to be applied in states engaged in a sovereign diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China. The Republic of China was engaged in a sovereign diplomatic relationship with the United States until January 1, 1979, and its initial objective with the all-out diplomatic program in the United States was to secure its sovereign diplomatic relationship. On December 15, 1978, the United States decided to adopt a "one-China" agreement with the People's Republic of China, however, and the Republic of China was forced to change its application of the all-out diplomatic program and focus on the articulation of a non-sovereign diplomatic relationship. The Republic of China was able to use the visitation element of its all-out diplomatic program to its advantage, because it was in operation before and after the December 15, 1978 decision of the United States to adopt a "one-China" agreement. Specifically, the Republic of China was able to use the visitation element to coordinate the interests, at least to a certain extent, of the Chiang administration and members of Congress on

43 Bush, *At Cross-Purposes*, 151; Myers, *A Unique Relationship*, 27-28; Lee, *The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act*, 50-51.

44 Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 200-01, 210-11; Yang, "With Dignity and Vigour," 9-18; "Events from Day to Day," in *Free China Journal* 29:2, 52.

45 Myers, *A Unique Relationship*, 33.

46 Lee, *The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act*, 58-171.

47 Lee, *The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act*, 172-74; Myers, *A Unique Relationship*, 49-76.

the articulation of a non-sovereign diplomatic relationship. A passage from the work of David Lee, the current representative of Taiwan in Canada, is of considerable value to the explanation presented here:

Taiwan had excellent public relations on Capitol Hill. Many Members of Congress had visited Taiwan either through invitations from Taiwan institutions or as part of a "code" (a congressional delegation trip paid for by US taxpayers). During their stay, they witnessed first-hand the economic miracle created by the small island country. Since the early 1970s, when Taiwan began its Congressional staff trip program, every year scores of important staff members shared a similar experience. Hardly anyone left Taiwan without a good impression. All these efforts paid off during the *Taiwan Relations Act* deliberations.⁴⁸

The redraft process of the Taiwan Omnibus Bill in the Congress was, therefore, at least to some extent, coordinated with the assistance of the visitation element of the all-out diplomatic program of the Republic of China.⁴⁹

In a slight variation on the explanation presented here, there was also a significant element of feedback on the development of the all-out diplomatic program of the Republic of China associated with the redraft process of the Taiwan Omnibus Bill and its consequent product, the *Taiwan Relations Act*. The decision of Congress to redraft the Taiwan Omnibus Bill in a fashion amenable to the interests of the Republic of China was of great significance to the subsequent development of the all-out diplomatic program, because of the potential it demonstrated with respect to the development and sanction of legislation amenable to the interests of the Republic of China in the legislatures of other states.⁵⁰ The *Taiwan Relations Act* was significant because it represented the articulation of an enhanced, non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, complete with passages on regional strategic concerns, the reciprocal establishment of non-sovereign diplomatic offices, and the preservation of other non-sovereign diplomatic mechanisms and networks on a bilateral basis.⁵¹

In Canada, the Republic of China was intent on the continued application of its all-out diplomatic program in the aftermath of the development and sanction of the *Taiwan Relations Act* in the United States, and it decided to reorganize the visitation element of its diplomatic program to promote an improvement in its operation and empirical effects. The establishment of the Canada–Taiwan Trade Council in May 1978 was the first attempt of the Republic of China to reorganize and improve the application of its all-out diplomatic program in Canada, and the council was able to combine the visitation element of the diplomatic program with the promotion of an enhanced bilateral economic relationship. The Canada–Taiwan Trade Council engaged in a significant number of diplomatic efforts in Canada and, in conjunction with its role as the indirect contact of the Republic of China with the Parliament of Canada, it was responsible for the organization of an economic procurement mission from Taiwan to Canada in May 1979 and for the development of an unfulfilled set of Canada–Taiwan Trade Council offices in Toronto and Taipei.⁵² The council was short-lived, however, and its operations ceased after three years of service due to a shortage of finance.⁵³

The ceased operations of Canada–Taiwan Trade Council coincided with significant progress in the results of the all-out diplomatic program. The General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China office was established in Toronto with the permission of the Government of Canada on July 11, 1980, and the office was

48 Lee, *The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act*, 178.

49 The evidence of the coordination process was published, in an explicit fashion, in the general and diplomatic yearbooks of the Republic of China. The *Free China Journal* also published explicit evidence on the interactions of members of Congress with the Chiang administration. See Yang, "With Dignity and Vigour," 9-18; Yang, "Ongoing American Friendship," 9-14; Yang, "Counting Our Friends," 9-15; Liu, "ROC-US Relations, 22-28; Yang, "Picking Up the Pieces," 9-15; Yang, "US, Free China and the Treaty," 9-16.

50 The evidence for the passage is derived from private conversations with academics in Taiwan.

51 Japan established a non-sovereign diplomatic representative office in Taiwan in 1972, but it never developed a piece of national legislation like the *Taiwan Relations Act*. See United States. United States Congress *Taiwan Relations Act* 96th Congress, Law 96-8 (January 1, 1979); Li, *De-Recognizing Taiwan*, 19, 26.

52 Rusk, "Taiwanese Are Trying Hard"; Lukasiewicz, "Dramatic Growth Is Expected"; Lukasiewicz, "Taiwan Grain Orders"; Westell, "Senator Tries to Promote"; Williamson, "Closed Doors Hid."

53 Lukasiewicz, "Imports Pour In."

able to replace the Canada–Taiwan Trade Council as the indirect contact of the Republic of China with the Parliament of Canada and as the promoter of an enhanced bilateral economic relationship. The General Chamber of Commerce office was, furthermore, able to enhance its diplomatic efforts in the solicitation of support from the Parliament of Canada with the assistance of the Far East Trade Services offices, because the combined efforts of these four offices in the promotion of an enhanced bilateral economic relationship created a powerful mechanism of attraction for members of Parliament who were in search of an electoral and, in a related fashion, an economic advantage.⁵⁴

The establishment of the Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group in December 1982 clearly resulted from these combined efforts within the all-out diplomatic program of the Republic of China. Although the establishment of the Friendship Group was a reserved affair, a few indications as to its genesis were evident. The Republic of China invited Progressive Conservative MP Otto Jelinek, the founder and first chairman of the Friendship Group, to visit Taiwan from January 17 to 23, 1978, through contact with the Parliament of Canada. Jelinek was inclined to accept the invitation because he shared an appreciation with fellow Progressive Conservative Robert Coates for the rhetoric of anti-communism expressed in the diplomatic struggle of the Republic of China with the People's Republic of China.⁵⁵ Although the visit created an initial contact for the Republic of China with Otto Jelinek, the motivation to establish a Friendship Group was not present until after the General Chamber of Commerce and the Far East Trade Services offices were able to combine the solicitation of visits with the promotion of an enhanced bilateral economic relationship.⁵⁶

The earliest operations of the Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group were coordinated with the assistance of Patrick Chang, a staff member at the General Chamber of Commerce office from January 1983 until February 1986, but these coordinated operations were not revealed until the Government of Canada ordered the deportation of Patrick Chang for unsanctioned diplomatic activities in February 1986.⁵⁷ The first delegation of seven MPs from the Friendship Group to visit Taiwan departed in April 1983, and after they returned to Canada, Otto Jelinek delivered a message to the House of Commons on the potential economic benefits of an office in Taiwan.⁵⁸ He repeated this message to the House of Commons on three separate occasions from April 1983 until May 1983, but the Liberal government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau responded in the negative each time, referring to the stable growth in the bilateral economic relationship Canada maintained with Taiwan and the People's Republic of China for its justification.⁵⁹

Accordingly, the Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group decided to increase the coordination of its efforts in order to boost its initiative to establish an office in Taiwan. On September 21, 1983, Otto Jelinek delivered a number of consecutive announcements in the House of Commons, and in the process he revealed the substance of the coordinated efforts behind the diplomatic initiative. The first announcement was to propose a private member's bill wherein he recommended Canada establish an office in Taiwan.⁶⁰ The second announcement was to advertise the recent decision of the Board of Foreign Trade in the Republic of China to send a 14-member economic procurement mission to Canada scheduled for November 9 to 23, 1983.⁶¹ The third and final announcement was to reveal the support of the 60 to 70 MPs in the Friendship Group for the private member's bill.⁶²

54 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session, 3427, 5709; Rusk, "Taiwanese Are Trying Hard"; Lukasiewicz, "Dramatic Growth Is Expected"; Lukasiewicz, "Taiwan Grain Order"; Smylie, "Trade with Taiwan"; Westell, "Senator Tries to Promote"; Williamson, "Closed Doors Hid"; "Taiwan Trade"; Lukasiewicz, "Imports Pour In"; "Economic Milestones," *Free China Journal* 30:10, 41.

55 "Events from Day to Day," *Free China Journal* 28: 3, 49; Republic of China, Government Information Office, *China Yearbook: 1979*, 347-48.

56 Fritzen, "Sino-Canadian Relations" 312; Vienneau, "MPs Visit Taiwan"; Vienneau, "Taiwan Trip No Junket"; Republic of China, Government Information Office, *Republic of China, 1983*, 304.

57 "Taiwan Representative Ordered"; Malarek, "Taiwanese Envoy Fights Deportation."

58 "MPs Visit Taiwan"; "Taiwan Trip No 'Junket'"; Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session, 24948.

59 *Ibid.*, 25133-34, 25335-37.

60 *Ibid.*, 27339-40; Canada, House of Commons, *House of Commons Journals* 32nd Parliament, 1st Session 126: 549 (September 21, 1983), 6200.

61 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session, 27340-41; "Trade Mission"; "Taiwan Buys More Potash"; "Taiwan Urges More Trade."

62 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session, 27341.

The private member's bill was never put to a vote or forwarded in the legislative process, because it failed to elicit the requisite sanction of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, but the Friendship Group was not deterred.⁶³ A second delegation of 12 MPs from the Friendship Group departed for Taiwan in October 1983, and after they returned to Canada a number of participants delivered messages to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence on the initiative of the Friendship Group to establish an office in Taiwan. These MPs included Otto Jelinek and, Liberal Ursula Appolloni, and their messages were replete with references to the non-sovereign diplomatic offices other states had established in Taiwan.⁶⁴

The response from the Liberal government was nuanced in comparison with its previous responses, and although Gerald Regan, the minister of international trade, was inclined to repeat the "one-China" agreement guidelines operative in Canada, he also indicated that the Canadian Chamber of Commerce was interested in establishing an office in Taiwan.⁶⁵ In the aftermath of Regan's response, the Friendship Group engaged in another visit to Taiwan from January 6 to 11, 1984, and after the nine MPs returned to Canada, the process in the House of Commons Standing Committee was repeated, with messages delivered from Progressive Conservatives Ronald Stewart and Robert Wenman, and Liberals Ursula Appolloni and Gérald Laniel.⁶⁶ Their messages were sophisticated, and each one of these four MPs referred to the reciprocal establishment of non-sovereign diplomatic offices in the relationship the United States maintained with Taiwan.⁶⁷

The program of the Friendship Group in its earliest operations was developed in its frequent interactions with the Republic of China in Taiwan, and it reflected the efforts of the Republic of China to articulate non-sovereign diplomatic relationships within the context of the bilateral "one-China" agreements its diplomatic partners had signed with the People's Republic of China. The non-sovereign diplomatic relationship the United States maintained with Taiwan was the template for the Republic of China with regard to Canada, because the relationship represented, with the assistance of the *Taiwan Relations Act*, the most enhanced non-sovereign diplomatic relationship available. The Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group was inclined, therefore, after its visits to Taiwan, to refer to elements in the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship the United States maintained with Taiwan, and insofar as its earliest initiative was to encourage the Government of Canada to sanction and support the establishment of a non-sovereign diplomatic office in Taiwan, it referred in a number of instances to the American Institute in Taiwan provided for in the *Taiwan Relations Act*. A letter from Progressive Conservative Howard Crosby, a member of the Friendship Group, to Joe Clark, the minister of foreign affairs, in April 1985 provided a detailed explanation of the earliest and, based on the subsequent evidence, current program of the Friendship Group:

For many years, Members of the Canadian Parliament in the House of Commons and the Senate have sought to assist the Republic of China on Taiwan notwithstanding the recognition by the Government of Canada of the People's Republic of China on Mainland China as the Government of all of China on October 13, 1970...Some of these interested Members formed a Parliamentary [Group] called the "Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship [Group]." Before and since the formation of the Parliamentary [Group], delegations of Canadian Parliamentarians have travelled to Taiwan under various sponsorships in the hope and expectation of improving relations between Canada and Taiwan... The goal of the Parliamentary [Group] has remained...the promotion of a relationship between Canada and Taiwan similar to that established by the United States of America and other democratic nations that also recognize the People's Republic of China. The relationship of the United States and Taiwan does not involve diplomatic recognition but permits reasonable access between the two countries

63 Fritzen, "Sino-Canadian Relations," 373.

64 Canada, House of Commons *Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade*, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session (November 22, 1983), 19-21; (November 29, 1983), 15-38.

65 Ibid. (November 29, 1983), 15-16.

66 "MPs Visiting Taiwan"; Abel, "MP Delegation Tests Peking"; Canada, House of Commons *Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence*, 32nd Parliament, 2nd Session (March 22, 1984), 17-18.

67 Ibid. (March 22, 1984), 17-24; (May 15, 1984), 36-37; (March 29, 1984), 41-43.

through the American Institute [in Taiwan]...and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs [in the United States]...The members of the Parliamentary [Group] are also mindful of the trade imbalance between Canada and Taiwan and believe improved relations will benefit Canada.⁶⁸

The Government of Canada was reluctant to be pressured, however, and even after the election of a Progressive Conservative government under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in September 1984, it continued to try to make certain that the enhancement of the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship Canada maintained with Taiwan was articulated well within the boundaries of its bilateral "one-China" agreement.⁶⁹ The Department of Foreign Affairs in fact consulted with the People's Republic of China on whether it interpreted the potential establishment of a Canadian Chamber of Commerce office in Taiwan as a challenge to its sovereign claim, and after a negative response, the department proceeded articulating and establishing a suitable non-sovereign diplomatic office arrangement.⁷⁰ From the perspective of the Friendship Group, the engagement of Foreign Affairs was a protracted and inadequate effort, but the Government of Canada was inclined to refer to the stable growth in the bilateral economic relationship Canada maintained with Taiwan and the People's Republic of China as its justification.⁷¹

The Canadian Chamber of Commerce was able to establish the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei with the financial support of the Government of Canada, on November 28, 1986, and although the specific contributions from the diplomatic efforts of the Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group in its establishment were unclear, it was apparent that the network the Republic of China had established with the Parliament of Canada was in a process of intensification.⁷² In the aftermath of the establishment of the Friendship Group in December 1982, the number of visits to Taiwan from Canadian MPs increased substantially, and within 12 months of the first visit to Taiwan a total of 28 MPs had participated.⁷³ The partisanship content of the delegations from Canada to Taiwan was also changing: the proportion of Liberal MPs increased after the solicitation of visits was combined with the promotion of an enhanced bilateral economic relationship. The most substantial change was in the participation of Liberal MPs alongside Progressive Conservative MPs in the messages delivered to the House of Commons after visits to Taiwan.⁷⁴ The increased Liberal participation was in all likelihood due to the weakened condition of the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau during its final period of tenure.

The next section of this paper takes the analysis of the network established with the Parliament of Canada up to the present, and investigates the recent activities of the Friendship Group in reference to the legislative process of the *Taiwan Affairs Act*.

THE RECENT ACTIVITIES OF THE NETWORK WITH THE PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, AND THE RECENT ACTIVITIES OF THE CANADA-TAIWAN PARLIAMENTARY FRIENDSHIP GROUP

The "one-China" agreement Canada adopted with the People's Republic of China on October 13, 1970 was a pragmatic decision developed in response to the diplomatic circumstances at the time, and although these circumstances were subject to a significant amount of change, the "takes note of" formulation within the "one-China" agreement allowed for significant adaptation. The formulation was a representation of the decision

68 Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy and Relations – Taiwan, 1984-1986 (DEA File Date: April 30, 1985).

69 Canada, House of Commons *Debates: Official Report*, 33rd Parliament, 1st Session, 7584-85, 7638-39.

70 Wu, *Institutional Development and Adaptability*, 332-33.

71 LAC, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy and Relations – Taiwan, 1984-1986 (DEA file date: February 19, 1985; April 11, 1985; April 30, 1985; May 14, 1985; June 3, 1985).

72 Evans, "Taking Taiwan Seriously," 24; Republic of China, Government Information Office, *Republic of China, 1988*, 388.

73 "MPs Visit Taiwan"; "Taiwan Trip No 'Junket'"; "Trade Mission"; "MPs Visiting Taiwan"; Abel, "MP Delegation Tests Peking"; "MPs to Visit Taiwan."

74 There were, in fact, no outspoken Liberal members of Parliament on the subject of the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with Taiwan until after the establishment of the Friendship Group.

of Canada neither to endorse nor to challenge the sovereign claim of the People's Republic of China to Taiwan, and insofar as a challenge to this claim was an indefinite feature within the "one-China" agreement, Canada was able to adjust the boundaries of the agreement to adapt its operation to any significant changes in the diplomatic circumstances.⁷⁵ The adjustments Canada effected were accomplished in consultation with the People's Republic of China, and the adjustments often led to improved diplomatic relationships with the People's Republic of China and with Taiwan.⁷⁶ The Government of Taiwan endeavoured at times to adjust the boundaries of the "one-China" agreement in the absence of consultation with the relevant institution in Canada, however; in consequence, a difficult circumstance in the management of the "one-China" agreement in Canada arose.

The Department of Foreign Affairs was responsible for the management of the "one-China" agreement in Canada, and in the aftermath of the decision to include the "takes note of" formulation in the agreement, a Taiwan Panel was established in the department, to articulate the initial boundaries of the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.⁷⁷ The Taiwan Panel was coordinated with the assistance of John McCordick from the Protocol Division, but it also included officers from the various other federal departments with responsibilities related to the management of the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.⁷⁸ The panel's initial determinations were issued in a memorandum after a series of interdepartmental consultations were conducted from October 15 to November 3, 1970, and the content of the memorandum focused upon the logistics involved for Canada in the termination of its government-to-government contacts with the Republic of China and, in a concomitant fashion, in the subsequent articulation of its people-to-people contacts with Taiwan. In certain cases, it was not possible for the Taiwan Panel to create a clear distinction between the two varieties of contacts, however, and as a result elements of the government-to-government contacts were blurred in with elements of the people-to-people contacts.⁷⁹

The most significant case of a blurred distinction concerned official travel from Canada to Taiwan. The Taiwan Panel was not inclined towards a complete restriction on official travel from Canada to Taiwan, and so the guideline proposed in the memorandum was to permit the travel of officials from Canada to Taiwan, but to restrict the use of official passports during such travel in order to avoid an explicit suggestion of a sovereign diplomatic relationship. This guideline was not composed in explicit reference to Canadian members of Parliament, but it warrants being reproduced here insofar as it operated as the initial baseline for the subsequent efforts to regulate the travel of MPs to Taiwan after the all-out diplomatic program of the Republic of China was engaged: "Canadian officials can still travel to Taiwan but must do so on an ordinary passport. Officials based in Canada should ask the Passport Office, Department of External Affairs, to provide passports and obtain visas for Taiwan...Canadian officials while in Taiwan should maintain a low profile, endeavour to avoid publicity and keep official contacts (when inevitable) at as low a level as possible."⁸⁰

The guideline was an inevitable outcome of the effort in the Department of Foreign Affairs to create a clear distinction in the government-to-government contacts and the people-to-people contacts with Taiwan. Nonetheless, it represented a point of unbalanced contact wherein the Department of Foreign Affairs endeavoured to regulate the travel of officials from Canada to Taiwan on the basis of people-to-people contacts, and the Republic of China endeavoured to invite officials from Canada to visit Taiwan on the basis of government-to-government contacts.

The restriction on the use of official passports for travel from Canada to Taiwan emerged as part of a contentious debate in Parliament on June 23, 1976, after Progressive Conservative Marcel Lambert protested

75 Edmonds, "Canada's Recognition of the People's Republic of China," 210-12; Frolic, "The Trudeau Initiative," 193-216.

76 A significant example includes the consultations of the Government of Canada with the People's Republic of China on an air-services arrangement with Taiwan. See Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Political Affairs – Taiwan – Visits, 1988-1989 (October 11, 1989).

77 LAC, Consular Affairs – Policy and Plans – Consular Relations and Representation by Canada and Other Countries, 1965-1984 (October 9, 1970).

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid. (November 3, 1970).

80 Ibid.

a travel restriction stamp in his official passport.⁸¹ Lambert's protest was in direct reference to the inclusion of Taiwan in the travel restriction stamp, and although a number of other territories without sovereign diplomatic recognition from Canada were included in the travel restriction, the support Lambert received for his protest from MPs and senators was for the most part delivered in reference to Taiwan. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Allan MacEachen responded on June 29, 1976, explaining the stamp as part of a program to avoid an explicit suggestion of sovereign diplomatic recognition from Canada in the territories included in the travel restriction stamp.⁸² Members of Parliament continued their protest, in an intermittent fashion, and it was another four years before Minister of Foreign Affairs Flora MacDonald, explained in full the initiative behind the travel restriction stamp: the Department of Foreign Affairs was responsible for the decision to place the travel restriction stamp in the official passports of members of Parliament, but the authorization for the stamp was attributed to then-minister of foreign affairs Mitchell Sharpe, on April 21, 1973, and the active effort to place the stamp in the official passports of MPs was initiated on February 17, 1976.⁸³

The second most significant case of a blurred distinction in the elements of the government-to-government contacts and the elements of the people-to-people contacts in the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan concerned official travel from Taiwan to Canada. For a second time, the Taiwan Panel was not inclined towards a complete restriction on official travel, and so the guideline proposed in its memorandum was to permit the travel of officials from Taiwan to Canada, but to restrict the use of official passports during such travel, and to decide the merit of each application on a selective basis. The guideline also included a recommendation for a review process on the regulation of official travel from Taiwan to Canada, because the Taiwan Panel was at the time uncertain whether practical difficulties were imminent.⁸⁴ In 1971, the Department of Foreign Affairs was in fact inclined to implement a review process after the emergence of a number of diplomatic incidents related to the admission of officials from Taiwan to Canada.⁸⁵

Although their admission was conducted on the premise of people-to-people contacts, their activities were often related to the promotion of government-to-government contacts. The Department of Foreign Affairs was resolved, therefore, in the aftermath of these diplomatic incidents, to enhance its role in the admission and supervision of officials from Taiwan, and in its review process the department was inclined to recommend the referral of each visa application from Taiwan to its headquarters in Ottawa. This resolve was implemented, but the practical limits of its operation were uncertain, and diplomatic incidents were no less frequent.⁸⁶

A decade after the review process initiated in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Patrick Chang applied for a visa to enter Canada from Taiwan to work in the position of secretary-general at the General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China office in Toronto. The application was reviewed and approved by the Department of Foreign Affairs, but explicit conditions were attached. These included a personal pledge not to engage in the promotion of government-to-government contacts with the Republic of China in Canada and, specifically not to engage in the organization of visits by Canadian politicians to Taiwan. Chang entered Canada from Taiwan with these explicit conditions in place, and he occupied the position of secretary-general at the General Chamber of Commerce office on January 3, 1983.⁸⁷

In spite of the explicit conditions attached to the approval of his visa, Chang engaged in the promotion of government-to-government contacts with the Republic of China and in the organization of visits of Canadian politicians to Taiwan. The Canadian Security Intelligence Services completed an investigation into his violations of the explicit conditions on January 21, 1985, and it provided a suggestion to the Department of Immigration

81 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 30th Parliament, 1st Session, 14801.

82 Ibid., 14801, 14806, 14885, 14932-36; Canada. Senate, *Debates of the Senate: Official Report*, 30th Parliament, 1st Session, 2262-63, 2362-64, 2443.

83 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 31st Parliament, 1st Session, 1555.

84 Library and Archives Canada, Consular Affairs – Policy and Plans – Consular Relations and Representation by Canada and Other Countries, 1965-1984 (November 3, 1970).

85 Ibid. (July 15, 1971).

86 Ibid. (July 15, 1971).

87 LAC, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy Relations– Taiwan, 1984-1986 (February 12, 1986); Schiller, "Ottawa Says Taiwanese Official," A1, A4.

not to approve his visa extension application.⁸⁸ The Department of Immigration was hesitant in its approach to Chang, however, perhaps to avoid a diplomatic incident. The Government of Canada withheld its reaction for some time – that is, until a delegation of 10 MPs departed from Canada to Taiwan on October 6, 1985, and after the total number of MPs visiting Taiwan reached 65.⁸⁹

Patrick Chang was summoned to the Canada Immigration Centre in Toronto on January 21, 1986, and issued with a deportation order for February 12, 1986. Chang hired a lawyer, Mendel Green, to defend his position in Canada, but the evidence in support of the deportation order was incontrovertible. Media reports further damaged his case: Progressive Conservative MPs Murray Cardiff, Donald Blenkarn, and Peter Elzinga were quoted in the *Toronto Star*, referring to the assistance Chang provided to the Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group in its organization of visits to Taiwan.⁹⁰ Consequently, although Chang was initially successful in postponing the deportation order, the effort to defend his position in Canada was a lost cause, and the Republic of China ordered his return to Taiwan on March 1, 1986.⁹¹

The travel of officials from Canada to Taiwan and from Taiwan to Canada represented a point of unbalanced contact in the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship Canada maintained with Taiwan, and the effort of the Department of Foreign Affairs to regulate the point of unbalanced contact within the boundaries of the “one-China” agreement was a difficult endeavour. The department’s attempts to regulate the travel of officials on the basis of people-to-people contacts was in effect reversed at each point, due to the effort of the Republic of China to promote the travel of officials on the basis of government-to-government contacts. The placement of a travel restriction stamp in the official passports of members of Parliament resulted in a significant debate in the House of Commons and in the Senate, and in significant resistance to the effort of the Department of Foreign Affairs to regulate the travel of officials from Canada to Taiwan.

The deportation of Patrick Chang from Canada was in certain respects a successful endeavour in the effort to regulate the travel of officials from Canada to Taiwan, but the Government of Canada was not inclined to repeat it, because it feared the potential diplomatic consequences. After Chang’s deportation, the intensification of the network with the Parliament of Canada was placed in a sustained period of restraint, but the deportation was probably a transient cause of the restraint. The effort of the Progressive Conservative Cabinet of Brian Mulroney to regulate the visits of MPs to Taiwan was a more significant cause. A statement New Democrat Ian Waddell delivered to the House of Commons on February 14, 1986 was an accurate representation of the circumstance: “In Canada, under the Canadian Parliamentary system, there is a strict Party system. It is not as useful to lobby individual Members of Parliament as it is to lobby individual Congressmen in the United States. Individual Members of Congress have more power than individual Members of Parliament. Generally speaking, individual Members of Parliament do not have very much power. They are a part of the Party system.”⁹²

Although the delegations of MPs from the Friendship Group to Taiwan continued, the messages delivered to the House of Commons in reference to the enhancement of the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan were fewer in number. Brian Mulroney’s government was committed to the “one-China” agreement with the People’s Republic of China, and was inclined to work with the Department of Foreign Affairs in consultation with the People’s Republic of China to adjust the boundaries of the “one-China” agreement in Canada as the diplomatic circumstances warranted. The boundaries were in fact widened in consultation with the People’s Republic of China, and the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan was enhanced from 1986 until 1993 with the establishment of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices in Toronto, Vancouver, and Ottawa, and with the inclusion of a number

88 LAC, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy Relations– Taiwan, 1984-1986 (February 12, 1986).

89 Ibid. (January 11, 1985; February 19, 1985; October 15, 1985); “MPs Visit Taiwan”; “Taiwan Trip No ‘Junket’”; “Trade Mission”; “MPs Visiting Taiwan”; Abel, “MP Delegation Tests Peking”; “MPs to Visit Taiwan”; “Tory MPs Return from Taiwan Junket”; “The Ottawa Scene”; “Who Is Paying for MPs’ Trips?”; “Senators, MPs under Fire”; “MP Defends Free Trip”; “Ten MPs, Senators on Junket”; “Coates Leads Group of 10 MPs”; “Free Taiwan Trip Good”; Warburton, “Gray Defends Boudria’s Acceptance”; “Critic Sees Tables Turned”; Schiller, “Ottawa Says Taiwanese Official.”

90 Schiller, “Taiwan Rep’s Deportation”; Schiller, “Taiwanese Trade Official to Stay”; Schiller, “Ottawa Says Taiwanese Official Works.”

91 Malarek, “Trade Official Facing Deportation”; Spears, “Envoy’s Leaving Sparks Call”; “Taiwan Orders Home Official.”

92 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 33rd Parliament, 1st Session, 10840.

of Department of Foreign Affairs officers in the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei. In the meantime, the efforts of the Government of Taiwan to use its network with the Parliament of Canada to enhance its general diplomatic relationship with Canada were restrained, because the Progressive Conservative Cabinet enforced a strict discipline upon its MPs, and because the Government of Taiwan was permitted a certain degree of diplomatic access to the Government of Canada.⁹³

The network of Taiwan with the Parliament of Canada was in a period of restraint for a decade, but it was resuscitated after Taiwan engaged in a diplomatic effort to accede to the World Health Organization as an observer, from 1997 until 2009. To enhance this effort, Taiwan solicited support from a number of states with membership in the WHO. The first initiative was to request its sovereign diplomatic partners that belonged to the WHO to deliver an application proposal on its behalf to the World Health Assembly, but the application proposal was rejected because a significant number of these WHO members adhered to a series of bilateral "one-China" agreements. The second initiative was to solicit the support of its non-sovereign diplomatic partners that were members of the WHO. Although the points of focus in this second initiative were the United States, Japan, and the European Union, Canada and a number of other states were included as potential supporters.⁹⁴

The Parliament of Canada was susceptible to the solicitation of support from Taiwan for a number of reasons. Parliament was in frequent contact with Taiwan, due to the uninterrupted program of visits flowing from its all-out diplomatic program and, furthermore, Taiwan was prudent in its decision to pursue membership in an international institution focused on human health. The first statement delivered in the House of Commons in reference to the application proposal of Taiwan was made by New Democrat MP Svend Robinson, in the aftermath of the September 21, 1999 earthquake in Taiwan, and if there was an element of solicitation involved in his November 2, 1999 statement, it was not possible to determine. Although he had visited Taiwan at the invitation of its government in 1998, Robinson's concern of for the health of the people in Taiwan was genuine.⁹⁵

Svend Robinson delivered a second statement to the House of Commons on December 10, 2001 in reference to the application proposal of Taiwan to accede to the World Health Organization, but Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley, cited the "one-China" agreement Canada had signed with the People's Republic of China in his denial of the request.⁹⁶ In retrospect, Robinson's statements in the House were peripheral elements within the interaction of Taiwan and Parliament; the centre of the interaction was located at the level of the chairman of the Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group. The first chairman, Otto Jelinek, and the second chairman, Peter Elzinga, were inclined to promote the diplomatic program of Taiwan in Canada; subsequent chairmen Bill Attewell, Don Boudria, John Nunziata, and Paul Szabo were less so inclined. However, the seventh chairman, Liberal MP John McKay, engaged in a substantial effort to promote the application proposal of Taiwan to accede to the World Health Organization.⁹⁷

John McKay succeeded Paul Szabo in January 2001, and a few months later he participated in a delegation of Canadian MPs to Taiwan, organized with the assistance of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Ottawa. The week-long all-expenses paid trip started on August 1, 2001, and members received an invitation to the Presidential Office of Chen Shui-bian.⁹⁸ John McKay subsequently published an article in the *National Post* on

93 Library and Archives Canada, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian Foreign Policy and Relations – Taiwan, 1989-1989 (December 19, 1988; January 27, 1989; January 30, 1989; January 31, 1989; February 24, 1989; March 7, 1989; April 7, 1989; July 21, 1989; August 14, 1989); Political Affairs – Taiwan – Visits, 1988-1989 (November 3, 1989; September 12, 1990); Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian Foreign Policy and Relations – Taiwan, 1991-1991 (March 28, 1991; April 8, 1991; April 10, 1991); Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian Foreign Policy and Relations – Taiwan, 1989-1989 (July 18, 1989); "Taiwan to Open Ottawa Office"; "Taiwan Office Won't Have"; Gibbens, "Bilateral Trade Opportunities Improving"; Carlisle, "Opportunities Abroad"; Rusk, "Ottawa, Sensitive to Mainland"; Rusk, "Canada to Step Up"; Terry, "Airline and Trade Links"; Bociurkiw, "Canadians Crack the High-Tech Barrier."

94 The Republic of China, Government Information Office, *The Republic of China Yearbook: Taiwan 2001: Republic of China*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 2002*; Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, "Taiwan Wins US, European Support."

95 Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 1998*; Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 36th Parliament, 2nd Session, 273, 401, 1037-38, 1382, 1999.

96 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, 8057.

97 Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 2001*.

98 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, 7100; Republic of China, Office of the President, "President Chen Meets."

August 21, 2001 that detailed the interaction of the delegation with the Chen administration, and the initial coordination of the Friendship Group with the Chen administration on the initiative to promote the application proposal of Taiwan to accede to the World Health Organization:

When a...delegation comprising eight Members of Parliament, including myself, met with President Chen Shui-bian this month, he raised the issue of Taiwan joining the World Health Organization... President Chen wanted Canada's support...[The People's Republic of] China, however, pressures nations like Canada to resist the application. The "one-China" [agreement] means Taiwan has no legal status and therefore cannot participate in international health initiatives. How sensible is it to jeopardize health because of pressure from [the People's Republic of] China? Is that in our national or international self-interest?⁹⁹

After the August visit to Taiwan, the efforts of the Friendship Group in the Parliament of Canada were directed towards engendering support from MPs and senators for Taiwan's WHO application proposal. From 1998 until 2001, a total of 69 MPs had visited Taiwan, but the specific initiative of the Friendship Group was to collect signatures on a petition.¹⁰⁰ The petition in support of the application proposal of Taiwan was circulated in Parliament in spring 2002, and in a single month 162 MPs and senators signed it.¹⁰¹ The representative at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Ottawa published an appreciative article in the *TECO News* in summer 2002, wherein he thanked the chairman of the Friendship Group.¹⁰²

The network stepped up its activities even more in the spring of 2003 in the wake of the outbreak of the SARS virus in Taiwan and Canada. The outbreak was evidence of the need to ensure the access of Taiwan to the international health resources available in the World Health Organization, and the support of Canadian MPs and senators for Taiwan's application proposal increased as a result.¹⁰³ Canadian Alliance MP Stockwell Day was responsible for the first representation in Parliament on behalf of Taiwan in the midst of the SARS outbreak, and on April 3, 2003 he presented to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade a resolution in support of the application proposal. This resolution was approved with a vote of 10 in favour and 3 against, and it was later carried forward to the House of Commons.¹⁰⁴

Day was a participant in a parliamentary delegation to Taiwan from May 16 to 20, 2002, and he was a prominent supporter of the application proposal of Taiwan in the House of Commons.¹⁰⁵ On May 5, 2003, Day delivered a statement to the House in reference to the resolution in the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and requested the support of MPs for the resolution. The resolution received support from Canadian Alliance, New Democrat, and Bloc Québécois MPs, but the discipline imposed on Liberal MPs under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien prevented its being approved. The explanation the Liberal government provided for its decision not to support the resolution was straightforward, and it referred to the force of the bilateral "one-China" agreements among World Health Organization member nations, and the need to develop the support of the People's Republic of China before such an effort to admit Taiwan was feasible.¹⁰⁶

The decision of the Liberal government to prevent the approval of the resolution in the midst of the outbreak of the SARS virus resulted in recrimination by opposition MPs, who initiated a coordinated effort to develop and support a second resolution in support of the application proposal. Canadian Alliance MP Jim Abbott carried the

99 McKay, "Taiwan Deserves Our Recognition," A15.

100 Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 1998; Zhonghua Minguo 1999; Zhonghua Minguo 2000; Zhonghua Minguo 2001*.

101 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, 6424, 10723, 11088, 11832.

102 Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, "Ottawa Asked to Support."

103 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, 4821, 6444; Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 2003*; Taipei Economic and Cultural Affairs Office, "Message from Representative Thomas Chen."

104 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, 5239, 5813-17, 5866-67, 6454; Taipei Economic and Cultural Affairs Office, "Canadian MPs Support Taiwan."

105 Republic of China, Office of the President, "President Chen Receives a Group."

106 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, 5866-67.

second resolution into the House of Commons on May 26, 2003, and he delivered a sophisticated statement in its support. Abbott had participated in a parliamentary delegation to Taiwan from January 13 to 20, 2002, but the support he demonstrated for the application proposal of Taiwan emerged in the aftermath of the outbreak of the SARS virus.¹⁰⁷ Abbott's statement to the House was followed with statements in support of the second resolution from Bloc Québécois, Progressive Conservative, and New Democrat MPs, and the sophistication and coherence of each subsequent statement demonstrated the coordination behind the effort. Liberal John McKay also delivered a statement in favour of the second resolution, but in reference to his position as the chairman of the Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group.¹⁰⁸

The House of Commons voted on the second resolution on May 27, 2003, and it was approved with a vote of 163 in favour and 67 against, because a significant number of Liberal MPs decided to break ranks with the Liberal government, either by abstaining or by voting in favour.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, a third resolution in support of the application proposal of Taiwan was carried into the Senate of Canada and approved unanimously on June 11, 2003.¹¹⁰ These resolutions were unable to change the position of the Liberal government, however, because they were not empowered to bind its position, and because the Liberal government was not inclined to change its position until a more comprehensive support for the application proposal was reached in the World Health Organization.¹¹¹

The Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group was forced to reconsider its initiative to support the application proposal of Taiwan in the subsequent months, but in the meantime the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Ottawa was engaged in the sustained intensification of the network with the Parliament of Canada. The intensification was initiated in the period subsequent to the initial application of Taiwan to accede as an observer to the World Health Organization, and as a result of this redoubled effort the number of members of Parliament in the Friendship Group increased from a low of 37 in 1997 to a high of 109 in 2004.¹¹² The number of MPs and senators to visit Taiwan from 1998 until 2004 was recorded at 135. (Although a certain number of MPs were inclined to visit Taiwan for a second or even a third time, the number of invitations from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office was sustained at an increased level.)¹¹³

The engagement of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the intensification of the network with the Parliament of Canada received a boost in its earliest period with the appointment of a new representative who had a significant amount of personal and professional experience in Canada. Thomas Chen was appointed to replace Alex Fang in December 2000, and although Chen's efforts were a continuation of his predecessor's, Chen's personal and professional experience in Canada endowed him with many important contacts. One of the most significant was John McKay. Chen and McKay were former members of the faculty of law at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, and after Chen was appointed representative at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, McKay succeeded to the position of chairman of the Friendship Group in January 2001.¹¹⁴

Members of Parliament in the Friendship Group delivered a number of statements to the House of Commons in support of the application proposal of Taiwan in 2004, but the reconsideration of the initiative was not carried into the House of Commons until 2005.¹¹⁵ The House was in a period of substantial change after a federal election in June. The Liberals were reduced to a minority government, which created an advantageous situation for the Friendship Group.

107 Republic of China, Office of the President, "President Chen Meets with a Group"; Interview with Jim Abbott, March 24, 2009.

108 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, 6414-26, 6443-65.

109 *Ibid.*, 6540-6541.

110 Canada, Senate of Canada, *Debates of the Senate* 37th Parliament, 2nd Session.

111 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament, 3rd Session, 1454, 1456, 2035, 2586, 3185; Canada, House of Commons *Debates: Official Report*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session 2065-66; Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 2004*; Taipei Economic and Cultural Affairs Office, "Canadian Parliament Supports"; Taipei Economic and Cultural Affairs Office, "Canada Thanked."

112 Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 1997*; *Zhonghua Minguo 2004*.

113 Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 1998-2004*.

114 Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 2000*.

115 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament, 3rd Session, 1454, 1456, 2035, 2585-86, 3184-85; Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session, 221-22, 235-36, 2065-66, 3458, 5813.

A new initiative in support of the application proposal of Taiwan was tabled on April 4, 2005, and it was entitled the *Taiwan Affairs Act*. Conservative MP Jim Abbott tabled the *Taiwan Affairs Act* in the House of Commons as a private member's bill, after securing the support of New Democrat and Bloc Québécois MPs. The *Taiwan Affairs Act* was passed forward to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade for further consideration. Although the Liberal government was opposed, it was not in a position to influence the coordination of the opposition parties in support of the Act. The *Taiwan Affairs Act* was, furthermore, designed to force a change in the position of the Liberal government in reference to the application proposal of Taiwan, because although the resolutions approved in the House of Commons and in the Senate were not empowered to bind the position of the Liberal government, the passage of a piece of national legislation in the form of the *Taiwan Affairs Act* was.¹¹⁶

The *Taiwan Affairs Act* was modelled after the *Taiwan Relations Act* of the United States, and the two pieces of national legislation shared a number of similar passages. The *Taiwan Affairs Act*, however, contained some subtle, albeit important, differences. In one respect, the *Taiwan Affairs Act* represented a relaxation in the effort codified within the Taiwan Relations Act to expand the boundaries of the "one-China" agreement, because the passage in the *Taiwan Affairs Act* on regional strategic concerns did not include a provision for Canada to export strategic arms to Taiwan. In another respect, the *Taiwan Affairs Act* represented an enhancement in the effort codified within the Taiwan Relations Act, because the passage in the *Taiwan Affairs Act* on international institutions contained a provision to support the accession of Taiwan, whereas the similar passage in the Taiwan Relations Act contained a provision not to support the expulsion of Taiwan.¹¹⁷ The passage in the *Taiwan Affairs Act* on international institutions was in fact a representation of the influence of the network with the Parliament of Canada, and of the distance the Friendship Group was prepared to travel to support Taiwan's application: "The Government of Canada shall: support the participation of Taiwan in multilateral international organizations, including the World Health Organization, and urge other states and non-governmental organizations to support this goal so that Taiwan may play a role commensurate with its economic, trade, cultural, social and other positions in the Asia-Pacific region."¹¹⁸

The first session of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the subject of the *Taiwan Affairs Act* was convened on June 14, 2005, and the Department of Foreign Affairs delivered a number of statements in reference to its position on the *Taiwan Affairs Act*. The department's representatives were David Mulroney and Ted Lipman, and they explained to the Standing Committee how the "one-China" agreement with the People's Republic of China operated, and how the *Taiwan Affairs Act* endangered its operation. The "one-China" agreement, the two representatives explained, operated on the basis of consultation, and insofar as a consistent process of consultation with the People's Republic of China was maintained, the boundaries of the "one-China" agreement were able to be adjusted as diplomatic circumstances warranted. The *Taiwan Affairs Act* was designed to force Canada to support an expansion in the boundaries of the "one-China" agreement, however, and it therefore interrupted the process of consultation with the People's Republic of China. This interruption, the two representatives concluded, endangered the sovereign diplomatic relationship Canada maintained with the People's Republic of China, and it furthermore endangered the willingness of the People's Republic of China to compromise on the subjects of international concern related to Taiwan.¹¹⁹

The consideration of the *Taiwan Affairs Act* in the Standing Committee continued for a total of seven sessions until November 15, 2005. In the meantime, the People's Republic of China indicated its disapproval of the *Taiwan Affairs Act*.¹²⁰ The objective of the People's Republic of China was to preserve the operation of the "one-China" agreement on the basis of consultation, and its disapproval was therefore directed towards

116 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session, 4632-33; Canada, House of Commons, *Bill C-357*, 1-5; Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session, 5980-88.

117 Canada, House of Commons, *Bill C-357*, 1-5; United States, United States Congress, *Taiwan Relations Act*.

118 Canada, House of Commons, *Bill C-357*, 4.

119 Canada, House of Commons *Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session (June 14, 2005), 5980-88.

120 Canada, House of Commons *Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session (June 14, 2005), 1-8; (June 20, 2005), 1-8; (October 6, 2005), 1-9; (October 20, 2005), 1-19; (October 25, 2005), 1-6; (October 27, 2005), 1-7; (November 15, 2005), 1-7.

the passages in the *Taiwan Affairs Act* wherein the consultation process was interrupted. The passage on international institutions was an obvious example, because it forced Canada to support the accession of Taiwan to a number of international institutions regardless of whether or not the People's Republic of China was in support. The passage on the international status of Taiwan was another example, because although the passage was not intended to define a specific international status for Taiwan, it in fact enabled Canada to develop a relationship with Taiwan on the premise of a sovereign diplomatic relationship.¹²¹ The protest the spokesperson for the ambassador of the People's Republic of China delivered to the media in Canada on June 21, 2005 was in all likelihood in reference to the passage on the international status of Taiwan:

We take no exception to the development of normal people-to-people exchanges and economic cooperation and trade between Canada and Taiwan. The "Taiwan Affairs Act," however, is in essence treating Taiwan as a [state] and aims to change the status of Taiwan being an inalienable part of China and to create "one-China, one-Taiwan" or "two-Chinas." This runs counter to the "one-China" [agreement] the Canadian Government has long pursued. We cannot but express concern about this.¹²²

The seventh session of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the subject of the *Taiwan Affairs Act* was concluded on November 15, 2005, but a recommendation from the Standing Committee was not completed before Parliament was dissolved, due to a motion of no confidence, on November 28, 2005. In consequence, the *Taiwan Affairs Act* died on the order paper of bills in the House of Commons, and it was not resuscitated after the resumption of Parliament in April 2006. The number of parliamentary supporters for the *Taiwan Affairs Act* was substantial, and based on the level of support from the New Democrats, the Bloc Québécois, the Conservatives, and some Liberals, 150 is a realistic estimation.¹²³ The number of participants in the actual decision to draft and table the *Taiwan Affairs Act* is difficult to discern, but insofar as the *Act* was drafted to solicit the comprehensive support of the House of Commons, the participants probably included MPs from all parties.¹²⁴ The significant number of supporters and participants was a representation of the power of the network Taiwan established with the Parliament of Canada, but it also represented its climax insofar as the subsequent Parliament did not resuscitate the *Act*.

Paul Martin's Liberal government was forced to call an election for January 23, 2006, and in the aftermath the Conservatives formed a government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper. The Conservatives were not inclined to reconsider the *Taiwan Affairs Act*, and it was not tabled in the House of Commons for a second time. The Conservative government was forced to come to terms with the importance of the sovereign diplomatic relationship Canada maintained with the People's Republic of China and, in a similar fashion, it was forced to face the fact that the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with Taiwan was secure within the boundaries of the "one-China" agreement. It signalled the change in its disposition to the People's Republic of China on March 12, 2008 with a speech delivered to the heads of mission from the Asia-Pacific region in Ottawa. In the speech, Maxime Bernier, the minister of foreign affairs, referred to the adherence of the Government of Canada to the "one-China" agreement, and he reiterated the commitment to the development of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and Taiwan inside the "one-China" boundaries.¹²⁵ The People's Republic of China in turn signalled its reception of the speech on March 16, 2008, when a spokesperson from its Foreign Ministry indicated the appreciation of the People's Republic of China for the change in disposition.¹²⁶

121 Canada, House of Commons, *Bill C-357*, 3-4.

122 People's Republic of China, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Canada, "Embassy Spokesperson's Remarks."

123 The number of members of Parliament to sign the petition in support of the application proposal of Taiwan to accede to the World Health Organization in 2002 was 162. The number to vote in favour of the second resolution in was 163. In 2005, all opposition parties indicated comprehensive support for the *Taiwan Affairs Act*, and the number of MPs in the opposition parties was 172. The number of MPs in the Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group in 2004 was 109, and the membership was indicated to be over 100 in 2005. See Economic and Cultural Affairs Office, "Ottawa Asked to Support"; Canada, House of Commons, *Debates: Official Report*, 37th Parliament 2nd Session, 6540; Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhonghua Minguo 2004*.

124 The evidence for the participation of MPs from all parties in the draft process of the *Taiwan Affairs Act* was corroborated during a private conversation in Taiwan.

125 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Notes for an Address."

126 People's Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "China Applauds."

The support for the application proposal of Taiwan to accede to the World Health Organization as an observer was developed in a gradual fashion in consultation with the People's Republic of China, and its accession was achieved on April 29, 2009, after the People's Republic of China announced its decision to withdraw its objections at the World Health Assembly.¹²⁷ The administration of President Ma Ying-jeou was a significant factor in the decision, because it was the first Government of Taiwan to respect the operation of the international network of bilateral "one-China" agreements with the People's Republic of China. The network Taiwan established with the Parliament of Canada was still in operation after the election of President Ma Ying-jeou, however, and the visits of members of Parliament from Canada to Taiwan were still common and important events. Jim Abbott succeeded John McKay to the position of chairman of the Canada–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group, and in an interview on March 24, 2009 he indicated his intent to enhance the non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, albeit within the boundaries of the "one-China" agreement.¹²⁸ The latest delegation of MPs to visit Taiwan departed on July 6 and returned on July 10, 2009.¹²⁹

127 Bradsher, "Taiwan Takes Step Forward."

128 Interview with Jim Abbott, March 24, 2009.

129 Republic of China, Office of the President, "President Ma Meets."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abel, Allen. "MP Delegation Tests Peking in Exploring Taiwan Trade." *Globe and Mail*, January 12, 1984, 14.
- Auman, Ann. "Is Canada Missing Chances to Boost Trade with Taiwan?" *Toronto Star*, March 4, 1986, B1, B4.
- Bedeski, Robert E. "Canada, Mainland China, and Taiwan: Recent Developments." In Yu San Wang, ed. *Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan*. New York: Praeger, 1990.
- Bociurkiw, Michael. "Canadians Crack the High-Tech Barrier." *Globe and Mail*, April 22, 1993, B21.
- Bradsher, Keith. "Taiwan Takes Step Forward at U.N. Health Agency." *New York Times*, April 29, 2009.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983.
- Bush, Richard. *At Cross-Purposes: US-Taiwan Relations Since 1942*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004.
- Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs. "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Maxime Bernier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a Meeting of the Asian Heads of Mission." March 12, 2008.
- Canada. House of Commons. *Bill C-357*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session. April 4, 2005.
- Canada. House of Commons. Debates: *Official Report*: 28th Parliament, 1st Session (1969); 28th Parliament, 3rd Session (1970); 29th Parliament, 2nd Session (1974); 30th Parliament, 1st Session (1975); 31st Parliament, 1st Session (1979); 32nd Parliament, 1st Session (1980); 32nd Parliament, 1st Session (1983); Debates: *Official Report*, 33rd Parliament, 1st Session (1985); 33rd Parliament, 1st Session (1986); 36th Parliament, 2nd Session (1999); 37th Parliament, 1st Session (2001); 37th Parliament, 1st Session (2002); 37th Parliament, 2nd Session (2003); 37th Parliament, 3rd Session (2004); 38th Parliament, 1st Session (2004); 38th Parliament, 1st Session (2005).
- Canada. House of Commons. *House of Commons Journals*, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session 126: 549, September 21, 1983.
- Canada. House of Commons *Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade*, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session. (October 22, 1974, February 12, 1975, November 22, 1983, November 29, 1983).
- Canada. House of Commons *Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence*, 32nd Parliament, 2nd Session. (March 22, 1984; March 29, 1984; May 15, 1984).
- Canada. House of Commons *Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade*. Evidence. 38th Parliament, 1st Session. (June 14, 2005; June 20, 2005; October 6, 2005; October 20, 2005; October 25, 2005; October 27, 2005; November 15, 2005).
- Canada. Senate of Canada. *Debates of the Senate*, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 2003.
- Carlisle, Tamsin. "Opportunities Abroad Promoted by Groups, Missions." *Globe and Mail*, September 18, 1987, C1, C2.
- Carter, Jimmy. *Keeping the Faith*. Toronto: William Collins Sons, 1982.
- Chiu, Hungdah. "Sino-Canadian Relations: An Overall View." In C.W. Kenneth Keng, Bij-jaw Lin, Thomas A. Wilson, and Roger N. Wolff, eds. *Canada and Taiwan (ROC): Evolving Trans-Pacific Relations*. Winnipeg: Kramar Printing Ltd, 1996.
- Cho, Hui-wan. *Taiwan's Application to GATT/WTO: Significance of Multilateralism to an Unrecognized State*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002.
- Cleroux, Richard. "Former Minister a Veteran Traveller." *Globe and Mail*, February 22, 1985, 5.

- "Coates Leads Group of 10 MPs, Senators on a Freebee Trip to Taiwan." *Ottawa Citizen*, October 11, 1985, A3.
- Cotter, Nicholas. "Ousted from Ottawa, Taiwan Employs Firm to Spread Publicity." *Globe and Mail*, September 29, 1973, 10.
- "Critic Sees Tables Turned on Patronage." *Ottawa Citizen*, October 19, 1985, A3.
- "Economic Milestones." *Free China Review* 20:8 (August 1970), 53-54; 26:10 (October 1976), 38; 27:11 (November 1977), 35-36; 28:9 (September 1978), 41; 28:10 (October 1978), 39; 29:6 (June 1979), 39-40; 30:10 (October 1980), 41.
- Edmonds, Robert. "Canada's Recognition of the People's Republic of China: The Stockholm Negotiations 1968-1970." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 5:2 (Winter 1998), 201-17.
- Evans, Paul. "Canada and Taiwan: A Forty-Year Survey." *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 1:1 (1990), 165-88.
- _____. "Taking Taiwan Seriously." *International Perspectives* 19:2 (February 1990), 24.
- "Events from Day to Day." *Free China Journal* 24:2; 25:11; 26:3; 27:4; 28:3.
- "Free Taiwan Trip Good for Trade, Boudria Insists." *Ottawa Citizen*, October 16, 1985, A4.
- Frolic, Bernie. "The Trudeau Initiative." In Paul Evans and Bernie Frolic, eds. *Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People's Republic of China: 1949-1970*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- Fritzen, Anemone. "Sino-Canadian Relations, 1949-2005." In Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Brian Tomlin, eds. *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives, and Politics*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Gibbens, Robert. "Bilateral Trade Opportunities Improving." *Globe and Mail*, September 18, 1987, C4.
- Johnson, Arthur. "10 MPs Accept Israel's Gift Trip, 5 Take Taiwan's." *Globe and Mail*, December 16, 1976, 1.
- Keng, Kenneth, Bij-jaw Lin, Thomas Wilson, and Roger Wolff, eds. *Canada and Taiwan ROC: Evolving Trans-Pacific Relations*. Winnipeg: Kramar Printing Ltd, 1996.
- Kissinger, Henry. *White House Years*. Toronto: Little, Brown, 1979.
- _____. *Years of Upheaval*. Toronto: Little, Brown, 1982.
- Lee, David. *The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act: Twenty-Years in Retrospect*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Library and Archives Canada. Consular Affairs. Policy and Plans – Consular Relations and Representation by Canada and Other Countries, 1965-1984. RG25, AC3, Volume 17248, File 80-1-5-Taiwan, Part 1.
- _____. Political Affairs. Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy Relations– Taiwan, 1984-1986. RG25, AC3, Volume 16055, File 20-1-2-Taiwan, Part 12.
- _____. Political Affairs. Policy and Background – Canadian Foreign Policy and Relations – Taiwan, 1989-1989. RG25, AC3, Volume 10843, File 20-1-2-Taiwan, Part 15.
- _____. Political Affairs. Policy and Background – Canadian Foreign Policy and Relations – Taiwan, 1991-1991. RG25, AC3, Volume 10843, File 20-1-2-Taiwan, Part 20.
- _____. Political Affairs. Taiwan – Visits, 1988-1989. RG25, AC3, Volume 12640, File 20-Taiwan-9, Part 2.
- Li, Victor. *De-Recognizing Taiwan: The Legal Problems*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977.

- Liu, Kang-sheng. "ROC-US Relations: Questions and Answers." *Free China Journal* 29:3. Taipei: Kwang Hua Publishing, 1979, 22-28.
- Lukasiewicz, Mark. "Dramatic Growth Is Expected in Canadian Exports to Taiwan." *Globe and Mail*, May 28, 1979, B7.
- _____. "Imports Pour In, Despite a Switch from Textiles." *Globe and Mail*, October 26, 1981, B12.
- _____. "Taiwan Grain Orders May Total \$40 Million." *Globe and Mail*, May 30, 1979, B1.
- Madsen, Robert. "The Struggle for Sovereignty Between China and Taiwan." In Stephen Krasner, ed. *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
- Malarek, Victor. "Taiwanese Envoy Fights Deportation." *Globe and Mail*, February 12, 1986, A1, A17.
- _____. "Trade Official Facing Deportation Flies Home on Taiwanese Orders." *Globe and Mail*, March 3, 1986, A1, A2
- McKay, John. "Taiwan Deserves Our Recognition." *National Post*. August 24, 2001, A15.
- "MP Defends Free Trip to Taiwan." *Globe and Mail*, October 18, 1985, A5.
- "MPs to Visit Taiwan in Bid for More Trade." *Toronto Star*, January 6, 1984, A10.
- "MPs Visit Taiwan, but Trip's Purpose, Financing Unknown." *Toronto Star*, April 19, 1983, A4.
- "MPs Visiting Taiwan to Strengthen Trade." *Globe and Mail*, January 6, 1984, 1-2.
- Myers, Ramon, ed. *A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China under the Taiwan Relations Act*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989.
- Paltiel, Jeremy. "Constructing the State: Sovereignty in Comparative International Perspectives – The View from East Asia," in André Lecours, ed. *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.
- People's Republic of China. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Canada. "Embassy Spokesperson's Remarks on the *Taiwan Affairs Act* Being Debated by the Canadian House of Commons." June 21, 2005.
- People's Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "China Applauds Canadian Foreign Minister's Speech on Canada-China Relations." *Xinhua News*, March 16, 2008.
- Republic of China. Government Information Office. *China Yearbooks: 1975–1980*. Taipei: China Publishing.
- _____. *Republic of China 1983: A Reference Book*. Taipei: United Pacific International, 1983.
- _____. *Republic of China, 1986: A Reference Book*. New York: Highlight International, 1986.
- _____. *Republic of China, 1988: A Reference Book*. New York: Highlight International, 1988.
- _____. *The Republic of China Yearbook: Taiwan 2001*. Taipei: 2001.
- Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Nianjian* [Republic of China Diplomatic Almanac], 1997-2004 editions. Taipei: The Ministry, 1998-2005.
- Republic of China. Office of the President. "President Chen Meets with a Group of Visiting Canadian Parliamentarians." Accessed June 22, 2009. <http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>.
- _____. "President Chen Meets with a Group of Canadian Parliamentarians Led by Bryon Wilfert." Accessed June 22, 2009. <http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>.

- _____. "President Chen Receives a Group of Canadian Parliamentarians." Accessed June 22, 2009.
<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>.
- _____. "President Ma Meets with Canadian Parliamentarians." Accessed September 12, 2009.
<http://www.president.gov.tw/en/>.
- Rusk, James. "Canada to Step up the Game of Peek-a-Boo Relations with Taiwan." *Globe and Mail*, May 22, 1990, B17, B18.
- _____. "Ottawa, Sensitive to Mainland, Is Cautious in Approaching Taiwan." *Globe and Mail*, April 3, 1989, C2.
- _____. "Taiwanese Are Trying Hard to Improve Canada's Trade Imbalance." *Globe and Mail*, March 4, 1978, B1.
- Saywell, William. "A Shifting Asian Power Balance and China's Changing Priorities." *International Perspectives: A Journal of the Department of External Affairs* 1:1 (January -February 1972), 7-11.
- Schiller, Ben. "Ottawa Says Taiwanese Official Works for Intelligence Service." *Toronto Star*, February 25, 1986, A1, A4.
- _____. "Taiwan Rep's Deportation Called Political Betrayal." *Toronto Star*, February 17, 1986, A6.
- _____. "Taiwanese Trade Official to Stay Here Until Hearing on March 4, Judge Rules." *Toronto Star*, February 18, 1986, A20.
- "Senators, MPs Under Fire for Taiwan Junket." *Globe and Mail*, October 11, 1985, A1-A2.
- "Sidney B. Handleman." *Globe and Mail*, June 9, 1979, B4.
- Smylie, Robert T. "Trade with Taiwan." *Globe and Mail*, June 29, 1979, 6.
- Spears, Tom. "Envoy's Leaving Sparks Call for RCMP Probe of Deportation." *Toronto Star*, March 3, 1986, A7.
- Taipei Economic and Cultural Affairs Office. "Canada Thanked for WHO Support at Taiwan National Day Celebrations." *TECO News* 6: 4 Winter 2003, 12.
- _____. "Canadian MPs Support Taiwan WHO Bid." *TECO News* 6: 1 (Spring 2003), 3.
- _____. "Canadian Parliament Supports Taiwan's WHO Bid." *TECO News* 6: 2 (Summer 2003), 1-2.
- _____. "Message from Representative Thomas Chen." *TECO News* 6: 1 (Spring 2003), 1.
- _____. "Ottawa Asked to Support WHO Observer Status for Taiwan." *TECO News* 5: 2 (Summer 2002), 5.
- _____. "Taiwan Wins US, European Support After WHO Setback." *TECO News* 5:1 (Spring 2002), 11.
- "Taiwan Buys More Potash." *Globe and Mail*, November 11, 1983, B4.
- "Taiwan Office Won't Have Diplomatic Status." *Ottawa Citizen*, November 15, 1990, E3.
- "Taiwan Orders Home Official to Avoid Diplomatic Dispute." *Ottawa Citizen*, March 3, 1986, A3.
- "Taiwan Representative Ordered Out of Canada." *Ottawa Citizen*, February 12, 1986, A1.
- "Taiwan to Open Ottawa Office to Perform Consular Function." *Ottawa Citizen*, November 15, 1990, B3.
- "Taiwan Trade." *Globe and Mail*, March 13, 1979, B16.
- "Taiwan Trip No 'Junket,' But to Aid Trade: Jelinek." *Toronto Star*, April 29, 1983, A11.
- "Taiwan Urges More Trade." *Globe and Mail*, December 1, 1984, B10.

- "Taiwan's Influence, Activities, Sparked Deportation Order, Paper Reports." *Ottawa Citizen*, February 26, 1986, B17.
- "Ten MPs, Senators on Junket to Taiwan." *Toronto Star*, October 11, 1985, A8.
- Terry, Edith. "Airline and Trade Links Strengthen Canada's Unofficial Presence." *Globe and Mail*, May 28, 1991, B18, B20.
- "The Month in Free China." *Free China Review* 24:2 (February 1974).
- "The Ottawa Scene." *Globe and Mail*, July 20, 1985, 5.
- Toronto Firm to Represent Taiwan." *Toronto Star*, September 23, 1973, A2.
- "Tory MPs Return from Taiwan Junket Urging More Trade." *Toronto Star*, November 1, 1984, A8.
- "Tory MPs Treated to Mideast Junket as Ethics Pondered." *Globe and Mail*, March 17, 1977, 8.
- "Trade Mission." *Globe and Mail*, November 8, 1983, B21.
- United Nations. "Vienna Convention on Consular Relations." *Treaty Series* 596. New York: United Nations, 2005.
- _____. "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations." *Treaty Series* 500. New York: United Nations, 2005.
- United States. United States Congress. *Taiwan Relations Act*. 96th Congress, Law 96-8, January 1, 1979.
- Vienneau, David. "MPs Visit Taiwan, But Trip's Purpose, Financing Unknown." *Toronto Star*, April 19, 1983, A4.
- _____. "Taiwan Trip No Junket, But to Aid Trade: Jelinek." *Toronto Star*, April 29, 1983, A11.
- Wang, Yu San, ed. *Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan*. New York: Praeger, 1990.
- Warburton, Wendy. "Gray Defends Boudria's Acceptance of Free Ten-Day Junket to Taiwan." *Ottawa Citizen*, October 19, 1985, A3.
- Westell, Dan. "Senator Tries to Promote Exports Unofficially." *Globe and Mail*, October 15, 1979, B8.
- "Who Is Paying for MPs' Trips?" *Toronto Star*, November 1, 1985, A18.
- Williamson, Robert. "Closed Doors Hid Feeble Parlay on Pacific." *Globe and Mail*, November 26, 1980, 8.
- Wu, Der-yuan. "Canada and the Global Diffusion of 'One China.'" In André Lecours, ed. *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.
- _____. *Institutional Development and Adaptability: Canada, Taiwan and the Social Construction of "One China."* Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, 2000.
- _____. "Yi Zhong Ge Biao" de Guoji Goucheng yu Zuoying: Zhidu yu Jiangoulun Guandian. Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 2009.
- Yang, Ming-che. "Counting Our Friends." *Free China Journal* 29: 3. Taipei: Kwang Hua Publishing, 1979, 9-15.
- _____. "Ongoing American Friendship." *Free China Journal* 29: 2. Taipei: Kwang Hua Publishing, 1979, 9-14.
- _____. "Picking up the Pieces." *Free China Journal* 29: 4. Taipei: Kwang Hua Publishing, 1979, 9-15.
- _____. "US, Free China and the Treaty." *Free China Journal* 29: 5. Taipei: Kwang Hua Publishing, 1979, 9-16.
- _____. "With Dignity and Vigour." *Free China Journal* 29: 1. Taipei: Kwang Hua Publishing, 1979, 9-18.
- Yen, Chia-kan. "Premier Yen Chia-kan's Administrative Report to the Legislative Yuan: September 24, 1971." *Free China Review* 21:10. October 1971, 69-76.

THE CIC CANADA-CHINA RELATIONS PROJECT

Bilateral relations between the governments of Canada and the People's Republic of China are a matter of strategic interest to Canada. Recent changes in the frequency of high-level visits, the effective style and content of bilateral communications and perspectives held about each country by various sectors of each other's society all suggest that the Canada-China relationship has changed significantly in recent years. Yet China remains vitally important to Canada for a variety of reasons and in a variety of sectors. Political and diplomatic cooperation on issues of direct bilateral concern and also on issues of global import remains critically important. Commercial and trade ties linking Canada with the world's third largest and fastest growing economy are of obvious importance. Cultural and civil society ties, including immigration patterns and the ancillary effects they generate, are also important. In these and other matters, the Canada-China relationship will likely grow in importance in the years to come. While the diversity of links between Canada and China militates in favour of giving due attention to a multiplicity of commercial, academic and civil society links, bilateral cooperation at the federal/central government level remains important.

In keeping with CIC objectives to advance research and dialogue on international affairs issues of importance and interest to Canadians, the CIC Canada-China Relations Project has focused on supporting research and analysis toward building a policy framework for Canada's relationship with China. The project's activities have been developed along three thematic areas that reflect issues of common concern: a) Chinese domestic institutional and normative contexts for engagement; b) Economic relations; c) Collaboration on global issues such as environment, health and security.

- a) Domestic Context for Engagement: The Canada-China relationship can be most effective when it is grounded on complementarity of interests, which in turn requires mutual understanding of domestic normative and institutional conditions in both countries. Canadian initiatives with China, ranging from WTO compliance and business regulation to human rights, can be effective only if they are designed and implemented in light of China's domestic conditions, ranging from popular norms to governmental structures and policy priorities. Similarly, China's success in nurturing productive relationships with Canada will require appreciation of Canadian domestic conditions. The papers for this thematic area were commissioned and directed by Professor Jeremy Paltiel of Carleton University.
- b) Economic Relations: Economic relations between Canada and China are critically important. Economic relations include bilateral trade and investment relations, and also extend to local effects of economic conditions and behaviour. In the trade area, Canada's strengths match up extremely well with China's needs. In trade and investment relations, efforts to promote normative and institutional accommodation in China for Canadian business objectives are consistent with Chinese development policies and also serve important Canadian interests in the areas of good governance. As well, national economic behavior by the two countries in response to changing economic conditions at the global, regional and local level have important effects on the Canada-China relationship. The papers for this thematic area were commissioned and directed by Yuen Pau Woo, President of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
- c) Collaboration on Global Issues: The importance of China's responsible participation in systems for addressing global policy concerns in areas such as environment, health and security cannot be overstated. Yet China's participation in the global community can be distorted by its responses to apprehension and competition from other global actors, particularly the United States, the European Union and Japan. Canada has a significant role to play in supporting China's responsible participation, not only through direct bilateral programming but also through our capacity to deploy good offices, legitimation and other soft power resources both bilaterally and globally. The papers for this thematic area were commissioned and directed by Professor Brian Job of the University of British Columbia.

The papers here presented in connection with the CIC Canada-China Relations Project offer informed, nonpartisan recommendations for a variety of stakeholders in Canada, including the government and private and public sector institutions and individuals, with a view toward furthering the development of healthy long-term relations between Canada and China. While historical and current conditions may result in disagreement as to how best to manage the Canada-China relationship, China's importance to the world requires our attention. We hope that the papers presented here can further the process of understanding and effective engagement that will strengthen the foundation for productive relations for the long-term interests of both countries.

Dr. Pitman B. Potter

Chair

CIC China Working Group

The Canadian International Council (CIC) is a non-partisan, nationwide council established to strengthen Canada's role in international affairs. With local branches nationwide, the CIC seeks to advance research, discussion and debate on international issues by supporting a Canadian foreign policy network that crosses academic disciplines, policy areas and economic sectors.

The CIC features a privately funded fellowship program and a network of issue-specific Working Groups. The goal of the CIC Working Groups is to identify major issues and challenges in their respective areas of study and to suggest and outline the best possible solutions to Canada's strategic foreign policy position on those issues. The CIC aims to generate rigorous foreign policy research and advice.

CIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Chair

Jim Balsillie, Co-CEO, Research In Motion

Co-vice Chairs

Bill Graham, Chancellor of Trinity College and Chair, Atlantic Council of Canada

Perrin Beatty, President and CEO, Canadian Chamber of Commerce

Directors

David Bercuson, Director, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary

Scott Burk, President, Wealhouse Capital Management

Raymond Chrétien, Strategic Advisor, Fasken Martineau

André Desmarais, President and Co-CEO, Power Corporation of Canada

Edward Goldenberg, Partner, Bennett Jones LLP

Nicholas Hirst, President, CIC-Winnipeg Branch

Jennifer Jeffs, President, CIC

Tom Jenkins, Executive Chairman and CSO, Open Text Corporation

Keith Martin, Past-President, CIC-Toronto Branch

Indira Samarasekera, President, University of Alberta

Janice Stein, Director, Munk Centre for International Studies

Jodi White, Distinguished Senior Fellow, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs, Carleton University

45 Willcocks Street, Box 210
Toronto Ontario M5S 1C7
TEL: 416-977-9000, 1-800-668-2442
FAX: 416-946-7319